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UNFAIR COMPETITION AS AN AID TO EQUITY
IN PATENT, COPYRIGHT AND
TRADE-MARK CASES
Modern procedural rules seek to achieve the ideal of
equity - the settling in one controversy of all the claims
arising out of a matter as against all persons having an
interest in it.
I. JOINDER As A MEANS
The policy behind the liberal rules of joinder of claims
and remedies was stated years ago by the reporter for the
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure in this manner: "It is sound social policy that all
items of potential irritation between parties be adjusted
at one time, so that repose can be achieved and litigation
not continued interminably."'
In federal practice, the problem was complicated by the
rule which forbade a federal court from taking jurisdiction
of a distinct non-federal cause of action when it was joined
with a federal cause of action.' The rigid application of the
rule led to the promulgation of the doctrine that when a
proper cause of action was stated under federal law, a fed-
eral court should not determine the non-federal claim join-
ed with it, although both actions arose out of the same
facts.3 The Supreme Court arrived at this conclusion by as-
suming that jurisdiction depended upon the federal cause of
action, so that the power to entertain the pendent cause of
I Clark, The Proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 22 A.B-A.J.
447, 449 (1936).
2 Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 245-246 (1933).
* Leschen Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 201 U.S. 166, 172
(1906); Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665 (1901);
Musher Foundation, Inc. v. Alba Trading Co., 127 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1942).
(438)
PATENT, COPYRIGHT AND TRADE-MARK
action disappeared when it appeared that the plaintiff was
not entitled to recover on the federal claim. Later, the Court
retraced its steps, repudiated these cases, and ruled that,
although a federal claim was rejected on the merits, the
federal court could still determine a non-federal claim,
such as unfair competition, which arose out of the same
facts.' The well-known case in which this ruling was made,
quite appropriately for purposes of this article, involved
the alleged piracy of a play. Relief was sought upon the
ground that the play had been copyrighted, and also that
its presentation constituted "unfair business practices and
unfair competition." The trial court found that, because
the play had been revised and the revision had not been
copyrighted, an action for copyright infringement, which is
a federal claim, would not lie. It then dismissed the unfair
competition claim on the familiar ground that it lost
jurisdiction to entertain it. In reversing this ruling, which
the court of appeals had affirmed, * the Supreme Court of
the United States said:
The bill alleges the violation of a single right, namely,
the right to protection of the copyrighted play. And it is
this violation which constitutes the cause of action.
Indeed, the claims of infringement and unfair competition
so precisely rests upon identical facts as to be little more
than the equivalent of different epithets to characterize
the same group of circumstances. The primary relief
sought is an injunction to put an end to an essentially
single wrong, however differently characterized, not to
enjoin distinct wrongs constituting the basis for in-
dependent causes of action .... Thus tested, the claims of
infringement and of unfair competition averred in the
present bill of complaint are not separate causes of
action .... 6
Presumably because some of the courts were giving a nar-
4 Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 245-246 (1933).
* Hum v. Oursler, 61 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1932).
6 Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 246-247 (1933).
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row interpretation to this ruling,7 Congress, in revising the
Judicial Code in 1948, provided specifically that a federal
district court shall have ".... original jurisdiction of any
civil action asserting a claim of unfair competition when
joined with a substantial and related claim under the copy-
right, patent or trade-mark law."' It is the writer's con-
viction that the doctrine of unfair competition or unfair
practices enables courts in these and other fields to achieve
equitable justice when restrictive legal principles stand in
the way. The present study is an attempt to justify this
conviction.
IL ON DIRTY TRICKS
Some years ago, Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr., began
an article on unfair competition with a story:
Several years ago when Edward S. Rogers, one of the
leading American writers and practitioners in the field,
was lecturing on Unfair Competition, he asked a stu-
dent: "What is your idea of this subject?" He got the
answer: "Well, it seems to me that the courts try to stop
people from playing dirty tricks." Mr. Rogers comments,
"One might spend weeks reading cases and find many
definitions less satisfactory than this."9
Chafee sought to show that there were "many dirty
tricks in business which the courts do not stop."' However,
if the development of the concept of unfair competition is
studied, it is apparent that the constant aim has been to
redress what Mr. Chief Justice Fuller in a noted case
called "deceitful representation or perfidious dealing.""
From the very beginning of this branch of the law,
emphasis has been placed upon the unfairness of certain
7 See Musher Foundation, Inc. v. Alba Trading Co., 127 F.2d 299 (2d
Cir. 1942).
8 62 STAT. 931 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1952).
9 Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 HIAv. L. REv. 1289 (1940).
10 Ibid.
13 Lawrence Mfg. Co. v. Tennessee Mfg. Co., 138 U.S. 537, 551 (1891).
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acts in commercial dealing. Therefore, the courts actually
condemn unfair practicesY Lord Chancellor Eldon was the
first to stress the distinction between fair and unfair
competition, stating in an 1803 English decision:'
In this case, protesting against the argument, that a
man is not at liberty to do anything, which can affect the
sale of another work of this kind, and that, because the
sale is affected, therefore there is an inquiry (for if there
is a fair competition by another original work, really
new, be the loss what it may, there is no damage or
injury) I shall state the question to be, not whether this
work is the same, but, in a question between these
parties, whether the Defendant has not represented it to
be the same; and whether the injury to the Plaintiff is
not as great, and the loss accruing ought not to be regard-
ed in Equity upon the same principles between them, as
if it was in fact the same work....
I have considerable difficulty as to the false colours
under which the original publication appears. Though
this is very usual, I cannot represent it to my mind
otherwise than as something excessively like a fraud on
the public. (Emphasis added.)
In other early English cases, fraud on another by giving
the erroneous impression that the product is his, and con-
sequent fraud on the public, are emphasized. So, in
Morison v. Moat,'4 the owner of a medical formula, not the
subject of a patent, was protected against sale of the
formula by another, who had acquired it by a breach of
trust and confidence. The Vice Chancellor gave these
grounds for the holding:
Different grounds have indeed been assigned for the
exercise of that jurisdiction. In some cases it has been
referred to property, in others to contract, and in others,
again, it has been treated as founded upon trust or con-
fidence, meaning, as I conceive, that the Court fastens
32 Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 Fed. 509, 512 (6th Cir. 1924).
See the writer's opinion in Brooks Bros. v. Brooks Clothing of California
Ltd., 60 F. Supp. 442, 451 (S.D. Cal. 1945).
33 Hogg v. Kirby, 8 Ves. Jr. 215, 32 Eng. Rep. 336, 340 (1803).
'.4 9 Hare 241, 68 Eng. Rep. 492 (1851).
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the obligation on the conscience of the party, and en-
forces it against him in the same manner as it enforces
against a party to whom a benefit is given the obligation
of performing a promise on the faith of which the benefit
has been conferred; but, upon whatever grounds the
jurisdiction is founded, the authorities leave no doubt as
to the exercise of it.35
In neither of the cases quoted from did the plaintiff have
a legally-protected right. In the first case' 6 there was no
copyright of the publication involved; in the second,' 7 the
court plainly stated that the formula there involved was
not patentable. Yet the courts gave protection against fraud
through the application of the principle of unfair practice.
In a more modern English case,' a person had used the
phrase "Stone Ale" as a trade name. Although the court
was of the view that this geographical name (after the
Staffordshire town of Stone) could not be registered as a
trade-mark under English law, nevertheless its use by
the defendant was enjoined. The situation was summed up
in this manner in the Chancery Division:
... He does not use the words "Stone Ale" for any
honest purpose whatever, but according to the evidence
with a distinctly fraudulent purpose.
Is there any reason, then, why the Court should not
deal with him accordingly, and prevent him from carry-
ing out such intention by r.estraining haim from using the
words which he will only use for that purpose? 19
On appeal to the House of Lords, the perpetual injunction
granted by the Court of Appeals was affirmed; Lord Mac-
naghten used this significant language:
It would have been impossible for him (the infringer)
to have called his ales "Stone Ales," and to have dis-
tinguished his ales from those of the plaintiff. Any
:1 Id. at 498.
16 See note 13 supra.
17 See note 14 supra.
Is Thompson v. Montgomery, 41 Ch. D. 35 (1889).
19 Id. at 51.
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attempt to distinguish the two, even if honestly meant,
would have been perfectly idle. Thirsty folk want beer,
not explanations. If the public get the thing they wvant,
or something near it, and get it under the old name -
the name with which they are familiar - they are likely
to be supremely indifferent to the character and conduct
of the brewer, and the equitable rights of rival traders.a°
As an indication of the continuity of judicial thought on
this problem, the Supreme Court of the United States over
a half-century later stressed that because the American
consumer is often motivated to purchase particular goods
through an attraction by a symbol, the law will protect
the owner of a "congenial symbol" and the "commercial
magnetism" of the symbol he has created.2 Prior to this
decision, the same Court, in referring to an English case
previously cited,' gave recognition to the right of our
judicial bodies to protect a news agency against a pilferer,
although the Court determined that such a right was
destroyed by the publication of the news. The Court said:
20 Montgomery v. Thompson [1891] A.C. 217, 225. By contrast, if the use
of a geographical name is not attended by any fraudulent representation,
any subsequent user has the same right as the first one.
"It must then be considered as sound doctrine that no one can apply
the name of a district of [sic] country to a well-known article of
commerce, and obtain thereby such an exclusive right to the appli-
cation as to prevent others inhabiting the district or dealing in
similar articles coming from the district, from truthfully using the
same designation. It is only when the adoption or imitation of what
is claimed to be a trade-mark amounts to a false representation,
express or implied, designed or incidental, that there is any title
to relief against it. True it may be that the use by a second pro-
ducer, in describing truthfully his product, of a name or a combi-
nation of words already in use by another, may have the effect of
causing the public to mistake as to the origin or ownership of the
product, but if it is just as true in its application to his goods as
it is to those of another who first applied it, and who therefore
claims an exclusive right to use it, there is no legal or moral wrong
done. Purchasers may be mistaken, but they are not deceived by
false representations, and equity will not enjoin against telling the
truth." Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311, 327 (1871) (Em-
phasis added.)
21 Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S.
203, 205 (1942). See Howe Scale Co. v. Wyckoff, Seamans & Benedict, 198
U.S. 118, 140 (1905).
22 See note 14 supra.
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Regarding the news, therefore, as but the material
out of which both parties are seeking to make profits
at the same time and in the same field, we hardly can
fail to recognize that for this purpose, and as between
them, it must be regarded as quasi property, irrespective
of the rights of either as against the public.
In order to sustain the jurisdiction of equity over the
controversy, we need not affirm any general and absolute
property in the news as such. The rule that a court of
equity concerns itself only in the protection of property
rights treats any civil right of a pecuniary nature as a
property right ... and the right to acquire property by
honest labor or the conduct of a lawful business is as
much entitled to protection as the right to guard property
already acquired.... It is this right that furnishes the
basis of the jurisdiction in the ordinary case of unfair
competition.23
The above statement demonstrates in broad view the
basic idea underlying the concept of unfair competition,
namely, the equitable right to protect a person against
appropriation by another of something which he has pro-
duced, although he has no real legal right to such pro-
tection. This idea is in accord with the true spirit of equity.
The very breadth of its formulation allows the application
23 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236-237
(1918). The doctrine of quasi property promulgated by the Supreme Court
in this case has not been applied by the lower courts to other fields of non-
existing or expired rights. See G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914,
916 (2d Cir. 1952); Millinery Creators Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 109 F.2d 175, 177
(2d Cir. 1940); RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940);
Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929). The
Ricordi case involved the photographic reproduction, with interpolations,
and sale of an Italian libretto based on Shakespeare's "Falstaff" and the
vocal and piano score of Verdi's music on which the copyright had expired.
Finding no simulation, imitation or other element of deceptive representa-
tion, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sustained a ruling which
declined to grant relief on the ground of unfair competition. In so doing,
the court recognized that in certain circumstances the appropriation and
sale of a literary work on which the copyright had expired might consti-
tute unfair competition: "We do not mean that the defendant could under
no circumstances be guilty of 'unfair competition' in his use of the 'work';
but it would have to be by some conduct other than copying it." G. Ricordi
& Co. v. Haendler, supra at 916. A more recent decision of the same court
raises the question whether the decision just cited would be followed
rigidly. Hartford Charga-Plate Associates v. Youth Centre-Cinderella
Stores, Inc., 215 F.2d 668, 672 (2d Cir. 1954).
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of the norm to a great diversity of instances of "deceitful
representation and perfidious dealing."2
III. CONFUSION OF SOURCE
Because concepts of ethics and decency in business are
constantly changing and the limits of human perfidy do
not admit of strict delineation, it has been difficult for the
courts to find a single principle to encompass all the situ-
ations involving wrongful appropriation of the creation of
another. All attempts in that direction, interesting though
they may be, are speculative at best.' In truth, the courts
use one equitable principle or another as the demands of
a particular case require, constantly bearing in mind the
ultimate aim of preventing "dirty tricks. '28
The fruitful systematization of unfair competition in the
24 See note 11 supra.
25 See note 9 supra. See also 1 CALL wN, UNFAm COIPETITION AND
TRADEmARKS, 68-143 (2d ed. 1950); 1 NIms, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-
mARKS, 1-72. (4th ed. 1947).
26 See note 9 supra. The fact, which so annoys Chafee, that many "dirty
tricks" are still allowed is traceable to the philosophy expressed in Katz v.
Kapper, 7 Cal. App. 2d 1, 44 P.2d 1060 (1935) at 1062:
"The fact that the methods used were ruthless, or unfair, in a
moral sense, does not stamp them as illegal. It has never been re-
garded as the duty or province of the courts to regulate practices
in the business world beyond the point of applying legal or equitable
remedies in cases involving acts of oppression or deceit which are
unlawful. Any extension of this jurisdiction must come through
legislative action." (Emphasis added.)
This principle received the formal approval of the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia in C. S. Smith Metropolitan Market Co. v. Lyons, 16 Cal. 2d 389, 106
P.2d 414, 419 (1940). By contrast, the equitable principle of fair dealing has
been defined in this manner:
"Rival manufacturers may lawfully compete for the patronage of
the public in the quality and price of their goods, in the beauty and
tastefulness of their enclosing packages, in the extent of their ad-
vertising, and in the employment of agents, but they have no right,
by imitative devices, to beguile the public into buying their wares
under the impression they are buying those of their rivals." Coats v.
Merrick Thread Co., 149 U.S. 562, 566 (1893).
Because such a high degree of ingenuity has been developed regarding the
similarity of products and processes, the courts may, at times, be slow in
responding to the higher ethical standards of business decency which call
for their condemnation. See Pattishall, Trade-Marks and the Monopoly
Phobia, 50 MicH. L. REv. 967 (1952).
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Restatement of Torts epitomized the ground on which
relief will be granted against unfair practices in a phrase
which now has become almost trite - "confusion of
source."' The object was to adopt a terminology which
would govern both misrepresentation and what is called
strictly ... passing off one's goods as those of another....
The efficacy of the formulation is evidenced not only by
the general use which the courts make of it in determining
cases of unfair competition regardless of the field in which
they arise,29 but also by the fact that Congress adopted the
concept in the Lanham Trade-Mark Act of 1946,30 defining
infringement, among other acts, as any use in commerce
of a registered trade-mark which ". . . is likely to cause
confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers as to the
source of origin of such goods or services . .. '31 This
provision effects a partial fusion of infringement and unfair
competition by making confusion of source of origin an
element of both violations. The added result is the creation
of a federal law of unfair competition so far as the law of
trade-marks is concerned, thus strengthening the power of
the Federal Trade Commission to prevent unf air methods
of competition.2
The decision of the Supreme Court in Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins33 makes it axiomatic that unfair competition un-
related to a federal patent, copyright, or trade-mark is
27 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 711-743 (1938).
28 RESTATEMEINT, TORTS, Introductory Note, p. 541 (1938).
29 See Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith Kline & French Laboratories, 207
F.2d 190, 196-197 (9th Cir. 1953). See also, the writer's opinion in Brooks
Bros, v. Brooks Clothing of California, Ltd., 60 F. Supp. 442, 450-451 (S.D.
Cal. 1945).
30 60 STAT. 427 (1946), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1952).
31 60 STAT. 437 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1952).
32 38 STAT. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952); FTC v. Motion
Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-395 (1953); Steele v.
Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 282-284 (1952); FTC v. Cement Institute,
333 U.S. 683, 690-691 (1948); see Bunn, The National Law of Unfair Com-
petition, 62 HARV. L. REv. 987 (1949).
33 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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governed by state law. 4 The specific inclusion of the
fundamental concept of unfair competition in the federal
law of trade-marks has created a new federal cause of
action on that ground, thereby giving promise of achieving
uniformity of adjudication in cases arising under it.3"
Differences between federal and state decisions in cases
concerning unfair competition are primarily differences of
degree. At all times, the aim of the courts has been to
enforce ". . . increasingly higher standards of fairness or
commercial morality in trade." 6
Commenting on this expressed aim, the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit has stated:
In any situation where the law is in the growing stage
it is not to be expected that the advance in all courts
will be simultaneous. Furthermore, when the final out-
come on a given set of facts may vary, not with the legal
concepts involved, but their application to particular
states of fact, the pattern is inevitably less clear than in
cases where a definite rule is to be applied. (Emphasis
added.)37
Additional cases will demonstrate the application of the
principles to situations in which, without resort to the
concept of unfair practices, redress. against apparent in-
34 Pecheur Lozenge Co. v. National Candy Co., 315 U.S. 666 (1942);
Fashion Originators' Guild Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 468 (1941); Steele v.
Bulova Watch Co., supra note 33 at 283; Bunn, op. cit. supra note 32. See also
Sunbeam Furniture Corp. v. Sunbeam Corp., 191 F.2d 141, 145 (9th Cir. 1951).
35 60 STAT. 440-41 (1946), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1121, 1125, 1126 (b), (g), (h),
and (i) (1952); Bucky v. Sebo, 208 F.2d 304, 306-07 (2d Cir. 1953); Pagliero
v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 341 (9th Cir. 1952). See note, Trade-
Marks, Unfair Competition, and the Courts: Some Unsettled Aspects of the
Lanham Act, 66 HAnv. L. REv. 1094, 1101 (1953); note, Federal Jurisdiction
over Unfair Competition, 37 Mmin. L. REv. 268, 278 (1953). The benefits of
the act have been questioned in view of the failure of the courts to agree
as to its meaning.
36 RESTATEMN, TORTS, Introductory Note, p. 540 (1938). In applying
the concept of unfair competition, the courts have condemned unfair deal-
ing, even though they found no fraud, because the absence of fraud "....
does not undermine the finding of unfair competition." Champion Spark
Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 130 (1947).
37 Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 206 F.2d 144, 145 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 867 (1953).
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justice could not have been granted.
IV. VARIETY IN DECEIT
The author of an unsuccessful play was allowed to re-
cover substantial damages because of the unauthorized use
of its title by another, despite the failure of the play and
the court's postulate that there could be no proprietary
right in the title to a dramatic production.3 The court said:
An author of a play has no inherent right in the title to
his production ...
There is no initial property right in household
semantics or words which are merely descriptive,
fanciful or geographic in nature.... However, if words
have been used by an author or manufacturer in such a
manner that the public has learned to associate them
with the product, book or play, they acquire a "secondary
meaning." This principle, which was first applied in
trade-mark cases, renders the words or symbols pro-
tectible and transferable because of that association. A
play may become known to the public by its title, which
thereby acquires a secondary meaning and attains a
protectible status.3 9
This decision was made under California law. However,
similar rulings have been made under federal law, the
courts holding that protection would be afforded although
the title claimed had not been copyrighted or was not cap-
able of being copyrighted.4" In two of these cases, the titles
consisted of a combination of ordinary words - "Slightly
Scandalous" in the second circuit Majestic Pictures case,
and "Gold Diggers" in the seventh circuit Loew's case.
38 Jackson v. Universal Intl Pictures, Inc., 36 Cal.2d 116, 222 P.2d 443
(1950). These rulings are merely illustrative of the fact that the courts
have used the principles of unfair competition to protect literary property
without regard to recognized legal rights therein. 2 Nnes, UNFAiR CoMrE-
TrrIoN, 884-938 (4th ed. 1947). As to the limitations of legal rights in literary
products, see Yankwich, What is Fair Use?, 22 U. CH. L. Rzv. 203 (1954),
Yankwich, Originality in the Law of Intellectual Property, 11 F.R.D. 457
(1951).
39 Jackson v. Universal Int'l Pictures Inc., supra note 38 at 436.
40 Becker v. Loew's, Inc., 133 F.2d 889, 891 (7th Cir. 1943); Warner Bros.
Pictures Inc. v. Majestic Pictures Corp., 70 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1934).
(Vol. xx.
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These words had become associated with the particular
production in the mind of the public rather narrowly in
the first case but more extensively in the second case.
Therefore, the first user was held to have acquired a right
which the law protected against the unfair practice of
another. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
stated: "It is true that they [the words of the title] are
words of general description and ordinarily would not be
subject to pre-emption by any one, but they may not be
used by a competitor to deceive a public which has long
attributed them to complainant's moving pictures." 1
In a case in my court involving a trade-mark, relief
was granted for unfair competition, although the trade-
mark "Looz" was held not fanciful.' The plaintiff, a com-
paratively small concern, had used the word as a trade-
mark and corporate name for many years prior to its
adoption by the defendant. The defendant had extensively
advertised its product, a weight-reducer, in the West under
the same name, at the expenditure of hundreds of thousands
of dollars. It could not be denied that by its exploitation
it had enhanced the value of plaintiff's trade name.
Nevertheless, the plaintiff was not deprived of full pro-
tection by apportioning the territory between the two:
When the first-comer in the field has had a distinct word
as its corporate name, has used it as a trade name, has
had a trade-mark under that name, and has marketed
under it products for a period of years, the later ap-
propriator is not entitled to the protection of equity at
the expense of public confusion.43
-The decision was under California law.' However, many
decisions prior to Erie R.R. v. Tompkins also support this
43. Warner Bros. Pictures Inc. v. Majestic Pictures Corp., see note 40
supra at 311; Becker v. Loew's, Inc., see note 40 supra at 893.
42 Looz, Inc. v. Ormont, 114 F. Supp. 211 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
43 Id. at 217.
44 See also Eastern Columbia, Inc. v. Waldman, 30 Cal.2d 268, 181
P.2d 865 (1947); note, Trade-mark Infringement as Unfair Competition, 40
CAJiF. L. REv. 571 (1952).
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proposition, forbidding the appropriation of a substantial
part of a trade name under the law of unfair competition
where the similarity was likely to lead to confusion of
source or sponsorship.45
Some of these cases turned on the validity of the trade-
mark. In the others, however, courts enjoined the late-
comer in the field despite the fact that the word appropri-
ated was not valid as a trade-mark. Later cases which have
arisen under the Lanham Trade-Mark Act have applied the
same concept where the name has been associated with
such a product as "Desedrine."46
The principle just discussed also has been applied in the
law of patents. A name identified with a patented article
will be protected unless it has become a generic name, in
which event the right to use it passes to the public at the
expiration of the patent. In this latter class are words such
as "Singer," for the description of a type of sewing ma-
45 This principle was followed even though the appropriated word was
an ordinary English word. For illustrative cases, see Fashion Park, Inc. v.
The Fair, 49 F.2d 830 (C.C.P.A. 1931) ("Fashion Row" as applied to both
men's and women's apparel as against "Fashion Park" similarly applied);
Queen Mfg. Co. v. Isaac Ginsberg & Bros, 25 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1928)
("Queen Brand" as applied to women's apparel in favor of prior user of
"Queen Make"); Photoplay Pub. Co. v. La -Verne Pub. Co., 269 Fed. 730
(3d Cir. 1921) ("Photoplay Journal" for magazine devoted to motion pic-
ture productions in favor of prior user of "Photoplay" for magazine of
similar character); Florence Mfg. Co. v. J. C. Dowd & Co, 178 Fed. 73 (2d
Cir. 1910) ("Sta-Kleen" for tooth brush against prior user of word "Keep-
clean"); Gannet v. Rupert, 127 Fed. 962 (2d Cir. 1904) ("Home Comfort"
as title for magazine in favor of first user who had applied word "Comfort"
to a publication).
Post-Erie cases, in similar fashion, have involved ordinary English words
and still reached the same result. General Finance Loan Co. v. General
Loan Co., 163 F.2d 709 (8th Cir. 1947) ("General Finance Loan Company"
and "General Finance Corporation" as applied to firm engaged in making
small business loans in favor of prior user of "General Loan Company"
for same type of business); San Francisco Ass'n for the Blind v. Industrial
Aid for the Blind, 153 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1946) ("Blind-Kraft" as applied to
brooms, brushes, mops, and furniture made by blind persons in favor of
"Blindcraft" similarly applied); Hygienic Products Co. v. Huntington Lab-
oratories, Inc., 139 F.2d 508 (C.C.P.A. 1943) ("Toilet-San" as applied to
porcelain cleaner in favor of prior user of "Sani-Flush").
46 Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith Kline & French Lab, 207 F.2d 190 (9th
Cir. 1953). See also National Lead Co. v. Wolfe, 223 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1955)
("Dutch" applied to paint).
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chine;4  "Shredded Wheat," as a description of a breakfast
cereal;4" and "Aspirin," for the drug "acetyl-Salicylic
acid."'4 However, in a recent case in my court of patent
infringement where protection under unfair competition
was sought to be extended to a color scheme and method
of marking cans in which Chinese food products were sold,
relief was denied on the ground that the defendant was a
prior user, that there was no evidence of confusion, and
that likelihood of confusion could not be inferred from
the mere fact that the cans were somewhat similar in shape
and color scheme. The plaintiff's products were found not
to have become identified with him so clearly that anyone
buying the defendant's product would think he was buying
the plaintiff's."
Thus, attention is directed to the proposition that before
acts which result in confusion are entitled to protection at
the suit of a particular litigant, he must show that the
customer in whose mind the confusion is created was his
customer, either actually or potentially. He can do so only
by showing that the name, form, or other distinct
characteristic of his product, whether it is a patented
device, publication (copyrighted or not), trade-mark or
trade name, has become in the minds of the buying public
so associated with him that anyone buying it would think
it was being purchased from him or that he sponsored it.
If they were buying the product as such regardless of name
47 Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mg. Co, 163 U.S. 169 (1896). See also Sax-
lebner v. Eisner & Mendelson Co., 179 U.S. 19 (1900) (mineral water known
under name of "Henyadi") and Dupont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Products
Co., 85 F2d 75 (2d Cir. 1936) ("Celophane"). By contrast, although pro-
tection will not ordinarily be given to a geographic name Elgin Nat'l Watch
Co. v. Illinois Watch Co., 179 U.S. 665 (1901), when such name has been
used for a long time to identify a product, it will be protected as a trade-
mark or trade name, Baglin v. Cusenier Co., 221 U.S. 580 (1911) ("Char-
treuse" for liqueur); Master v. Cribben & Sexton Co., 202 F.2d 779 (1953)("Sheffield" applied to steel products).
48 Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
49 Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 Fed. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
ZO Chun King Sales, Inc. v. Oriental Foods, Inc., 136 F. Supp. 659 (S.D.
Cal. 1955).
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or origin, he has no exclusive right to their actual or
prospective patronage. Absent such association, his com-
petitor is not poaching "... upon the commercial mag-
netism of the symbol... .,,' which he had created, and
there is no likelihood of confusion of source or sponsor-
ship.52
V. LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
A recent case decided in the Second Circuit has been
referred to as an unwarranted extension of the doctrines
under consideration.5 3 But rightly understood, the case
makes no departure from the established norm of con-
fusing similarity. It was merely its application to a border-
line situation, where, despite the disparity in the prices and
qualities of the two articles, there was likelihood of con-
fusion. The action had been instituted by an American
manufacturer to secure a declaration that it did not un-
fairly compete by manufacturing a clock similar in design
to a Swiss clock sold by an American importer and dis-
tributor. Damages resulting from suits instituted by the
importer against the American manufacturer and an
injunction against the prosecution of these actions also
51 Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S.
203, 205 (1942).
52 The cases which precede, footnotes 47-51 supra, have been chosen
because, in the view of the writer, they represent an approach to the prob-
lem which accords with his own view. There is no consistency in the de-
cisions even in the same circuit, as must be evident, for instance, when one
compares the ruling of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Stork Res-
taurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1948), and Sunbeam Furniture
Corp. v. Sunbeam Corp., 191 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1951), insofar as they limit
relief to competitive fields. As to the claimed inconsistencies in the rulings
in other circuits, see Developments in the Law of Trade-Marks and Unfair
Competition, 68 HARv. L. REV. 814, 843-893 (1955); Netterville, California
Law of Unfair Competition: Unprivileged Imitation, 28 So. CALIF. L. REV.
240, 279 (1955).
53 Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coul-
tre Watches, Inc, 221 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1955), and comment, 69 HA~v. L. REv.
392 (1955). For a somewhat similar conclusion under California law, see
Haeger Potteries v. Gilner Potteries, 123 F. Supp. 261 (S.D. Cal. 1954). See
also Netterville, supra note 52.
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were sought.
The importer and intervenor counterclaimed, charging
unfair competition. The trial judge found in favor of the
American manufacturer, chiefly upon the ground that
since the Mastercrafters' clocks were plainly marked and
advertised as their own, there was failure ".... to establish
that purchasers have been or are likely to be confused."
51
In reversing the decision, it was made plain that there
was copying and thus, the likelihood of confusion could be
inferred in the absence of definite proof that none existed:
The actionable harm, in a secondary-meaning case,
may result either from the likelihood (a) of loss of cus-
tomers or (b) loss of reputation, or (c) of both. Such loss
can result from the customer's belief that the competing
article derives from the same source as that of the com-
plainant. ....
True, a customer examining plaintiff's clock would see
from the electric cord, that it was not an 'atmospheric'
clock. But, as the judge found, plaintiff copied the design
of the Atmos clock because plaintiff intended to, and did,
attract purchasers who wanted a 'luxury design' clock.
This goes to show at least that some customers would
buy plaintiff's cheaper clock for the purpose of acquiring
the prestige gained by displaying what many visitors
at the customers' homes would regard as a prestigious
article. Plaintiff's wrong thus consisted of the fact that
such a visitor would be likely to assume that the clock
was an Atmos clock .
Plaintiff's intention thus to reap financial benefits from
poaching on the reputation of the Atmos clock is of major
importance. Of course, where there is no likelihood of
confusion - as, e.g., were the alleged infringing
article is not in a sufficiently adjacent field - then an
alleged infringer's intent become irrelevant, since an in-
tent to do a wrong cannot transmute a lawful into an
unlawful act. But where the copying is unlawful, if only
there is a likelihood of confusion, then the intent of the
copier becomes deceidedly relevant. It gives rise to a
powerful inference that confusion is likely, and puts
54 Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le
Coultre Watches, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 209, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
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on the alleged infringer the burden of going forward with
proof that it is not. (Emphasis added.) 55
It is quite evident that the reference to the impression of
"a visitor" in the home where the clock was located is not
made the ground of decision. It is merely an illustration of
the likelihood of confusion. A visitor, of course, could be
a prospective customer against whose confusion the law
also protects. It is very significant that the opinion in one
of the footnotes5" refers to two of the court's own recent
decisions where mere similarity of design was held not to
confer any rights which could be protected as unfair
competition.5  In one of those cases, the court summarized
the philisophy which denies relief from what the writers on
this branch of the law for many years have called "fair
55 Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le
Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 466-67 (2d Cir. 1955). The language
into which the doctrine of confusing similarity has been cast has not varied
through the years. In this respect, the language just quoted is merely an
expansion of similar statements in earlier cases. See, e.g., Celluloid Mfg.
Co. v. Cellonite Mfg. Co., 32 Fed. 94, 97 (C.C.N.J. 1887).56 Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le-
Coultre Watches, Inc., supra note 55, n. 4, at 466-67. In Brooks Bros. v. Brooks
Clothing Co., 60 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Cal. 1945), aff'd mei., 158 F.2d 798 (1947),
the argument was advanced that because the plaintiff was engaged in selling
high-priced clothes, while the defendant was in the low-priced field, un-
privileged imitation of a name should be permitted because it was unlikely
to injure the plaintiff. As federal judge in that case, the author rejected the
contention that price appeal through cheapness to a different stratum of
buyers justified an unprivileged imitation.
Although the Brooks case involved imitation of name the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit seems to have gone no further in the Mastercrafters
Clock case in dealing with imitation of form and appearance of product.
57 Hyde Park Clothes v. Hyde Park Fashions, 204 F.2d 223 (2d Cir.
1953); Chas. D. Briddell, Inc. v. Alglobe Trading Corp., 194 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1952). In 1954, New York codified the doctrine of "dilution" and made
the likelihood of dilution of the "distinctive quality of a trade name or
trade-mark" a ground for injunctive relief "notwithstanding the absence
of competition between the parties or the absence of confusion as to the
source of goods or services." N.Y. Bus. LAW § 341 (a) (1954). Under it,
federal courts have granted relief for unprivileged imitation in the absence
of a showing of a secondary meaning. Noma Lites v. Lawn Spray, 222 F.2d
716 (2d Cir. 1955) "Lawn Spray" used for type of underground lawn
sprinkler); Flint v. Oleet Jewelry Mfg. Co., 133 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y.
1955) ("Mustard Seed Remembrancer" in plastic ball containing mustard
seed protected against imitative articles called "Mustard Seed," "Mustard
Seed Charm," "Mustard Seed Faith Charm").
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competition":
The fact that the design of an article is strikingly novel
and beautiful, and the fact that its first producer has
spent large sums in advertising which has made the
article popular with consumers, give that first producer
no rights against others who subsequently imitate it
and (taking advantage of the consumer-popularity of
the article, due to the first producer's advertising) sell
it competitively - unless the first producer has a
monopoly based upon (1) a patent on the design or (2)
a so-called secondary meaning. Absent (1) and (2), the
first producer has no legal complaint because the imi-
tators have been enriched by his efforts, have enjoyed
what is known as a 'free ride'. For the common law
favors competition; and it is of the essence of competition
that competitors copy and undersell the product of an
originator. The competitors do not lose their favored
common-law position merely because some one chooses
to call them 'free riders'. To have protection from such
competition, the originator must possess some sort of
monopoly.5s
Whether dealing in the realm of patent or trade-mark
law, the courts will not allow a person to turn to his own
advantage a symbol which either lacks novelty or uses
ordinary words of identification unless the symbol, by
form or designation, has become identified with his prod-
uct. Thus protection was denied to one who sought, both
under the trade-mark law and as unfair competition, a
monopoly for its trade-mark "Squirrel Brand" as applied
to nuts. The court, while sustaining the mark as valid, held
that it would not prohibit its use by another in conjunction
with a picture of a squirrel and that such use did not con-
stitute unfair competition. It observed rather whimsically:
"It may be that the court below found it as difficult as we
have to visualize as ubiquitous and peripatetic a creature
as a squirrel, inured to the free life of a nomad, being
leashed or hemmed in and made the subject of mo-
58 Chas. D. Briddell v. Alglobe Trading Corp., supra note 57, at 418.
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VI. PROTECTION OF LITERARY RIGHTS
In the preceding discussion, some instances have been
cited of protection of literary rights under the law of un-
fair competition without regard to either the law of copy-
right or common law rights in literary property." How-
ever, resort to this concept in the field of literary and
artistic property has been so beneficial that additional
comment is justified.
In Europe, continental legislation and judicial inter-
pretation have recognized the moral right of the author,
artist, and creator to the integrity of his work (droit
moral). This right is derived from the right of personality
and is considered individual and not subject to alienation
in advance.61 In essence, it is: ". .. the right of the creator
to create, to present his creation to the public in any
desired form or to withhold it, and to demand from every
one respect for his personality as creator and for his
works."62
Generally, American courts have declined to recognize
this right. In 1948, when an attempt was made by four
contemporary Russian composers to enjoin a motion pic-
ture company from using the composers' music in a motion
picture, the Supreme Court of New York denied inter-
vention on the grounds that (a) the music was not copy-
righted, (b) its use as a background to the plot's depiction
59 Squirrel Brand Company v. Barnard Nut Co., 224 F.2d 840, 843 (5th
Cir. 1955).
60 See notes 13, 38-41 supra.
61 Stanislas de Gorguette d'Argoeuves, Le Droit Moral de l'auteur sur
son oeuvre artistique ou litteraire, 197-98 (1926); Henri Desbois, La Pro-
priete litterraire et artistique, 144 (1953).
62 Vargas v. Esquire, 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947). See also Katz,
The Doctrine of Moral Right, 2nd American Copyright Law- A Proposal,
24 So. CALiF. L. REv. 375 (1951); Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A
Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HAnv. L. Rv. 554, 578
(1940).
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of treason could not be enjoined as libel, and (c) assuming
that it existed, there was no violation of the "moral right"
of the authors.63 The court, while conceding that distortion
of a work might constitute a violation of the author's right,
declined to see such violation in the particular case. This
narrow view prompted Judge Frank to comment that
"... the phase 'moral right' seems to have frightened some
of those courts to such an extent that they have unduly
narrowed artists' rights."6
The case in which this comment was made illustrates
the procedure by which the doctrine of unfair competition
can be used to achieve, partially at least, the results at-
tained through the promulgation of the "moral right" of
the author to the integrity of his work. The court held that
one who had acquired by contract the right to sell master
phonograph records of orchestra recordings could not
sell abbreviated records with a credit line reading "pre-
sented by Norman Granz," the producer of the complete
recording. While ruling that the sale of such records was
a breach of contract, the majority also held that the sale
would be unfair competition, saying:
Disregarding for the moment the terms of the contract,
we think that the purchaser of the master discs could
lawfully use them to produce the abbreviated record and
could lawfully sell the same provided he did not describe
it as a recording of music presented by the plaintiff. If
he did so describe it, he would commit the tort of unfair
competition.6 5
Judge Frank based his concurrence strictly on the wording
of the contract, stating that resort to unfair competition or
to the doctrine of moral right was unnecessary. However,
as to the latter, he aroused hopes by stating parenthetically
63 Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 196 Misc. 67, 80
N.Y. S.2d 575, 578-79 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd mem., 275 App. Div. 692, 87
N.Y.S. 2d 430 (1st Dept 1949).
64 Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 590 (2d Cir. 1952).
65 Id. at 588.
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that while he based his opinion on other grounds, he did so
"without rejecting the doctrine of 'moral right' ... ,
Such instances indicate that under common law princi-
ples the moral right to protection against distortion of one's
work could be recognized. Reasoning from analogy, resort
could be had to the many instances in which the law
shields the integrity of personality through the law of
defamation and privacy and even protects one's property
against disparagement.
A case 7 from the Tenth Circuit illustrates the ease with
which the concept of moral right in the integrity of one's
work can be applied to protect disparagement of intangible
property. Paramount Motion Picture Company brought
action against a company which manufactured and sold
posters concerning its pictures to theaters without inserting
the legend "Paramount picture" or the names of the movie's
star artists. Paramount was contractually required to
include the latter in its advertisements. The complaint
alleged that the material was cheap, inferior, and gro-
tesque, and contained misleading and deceptive informa-
tion as to the company's motion pictures. The lower court
dismissed the action. The court of appeals reversed and
held that, apart from the question of unfair competition,
the facts stated an action in tort for disparagement of the
plaintiff's product and injury to its good will. The court
stated:
A large part of such business consists of intangible prop-
erty, that is the popularity of its pictures, its good will,
and the good will of its stars and featured players, all
of which is brought about in large measure by artistic
and attractive advertising calculated to present the
pictures and the stars and featured players appearing
in them in a manner which appeals to the public and
induces persons to attend shows where such pictures
are exhibited. But a court of equity will extend appropri-
66 Id. at 591.
67 Paramount Pictures v. Leader Press, 106 F2d 229 (10th Cir. 1939).
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ate protection to intangible as well as tangible property
which forms a part of a lawful business.
.... One without privilege so to do, has no right to
issue and publish an untrue or deceptive statement of the
fact which has a disparaging effect upon the quality of
another's property, under circumstances which would
lead a reasonable person to foresee that it will have such
effect. . . And if the statement is understood as one of
disparagement and the understanding is a reasonable
construction of the language used, it is immaterial that
the person making it did not intend it to be understood in
that manner.68
In subsequent material, references will be made to other
precedent, both English and American, in which, through
the use of these concepts of moral right and unfair
competition, and especially the latter, disparagement or
distortion of one's creative work was prevented.
In 1816, the English poet Byron obtained an injunction
against the publication of a group of his poems upon a
showing that there was doubt that one of the poems pro-
posed to be included was his, and "... upon the Defendant
declining to swear as to his belief that the poem in question
was actually the work of Lord Byron."6 In a later case,
the author of an English law book was awarded -damages
because the publisher printed a third edition of the book,
edited by a third person without the author's approval and
containing many errors. In submitting the case to the jury,
the issue was stated as follows: ".... The question.., is...
whether the third edition would be understood by those
who bought it to be the work of the plaintiff; for, if so,
I think the errors are such as would be injurious to the
plaintiff's reputation."7 °
American courts have granted relief under similar
conditions. In the famous "Mark Twain" case,' while
68 Id. at 231.
69 Lord Byron v. Johnston, 2 Mer. 28, 35 Eng. Rep. 851, 852 (1816).
70 Archbold v. Sweet, 5 Car. & P. 219, 227, 172 Eng. Rep. 947, 950 (1832).
71 Clemens v. Belford, Clark & Co., 14 Fed. 728 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1883).
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Samuel Clemens was denied the right to prevent the
publication by others of works under his pseudonym
(Mark Twain), which had become a part of the public
domain, the court recognized the right of an author to
prevent the publication of works which he either has not
written or not published:
• . . [N]o person has the right to hold another out to
the world as the author of literary matter which he never
wrote; and the same rule would undoubtedly apply in
favor of a person known to the public under a nom de
plume, because no one has the right, either expressly or
by implication, falsely or untruly to charge another with
the composition or authorship of a literary production
which he did not write. Any other rule would permit
writers of inferior merit to put their compositions before
the public under the names of writers of high standing
and authority, thereby perpetrating a fraud not only on
the writer whose name is used, but also on the public.
7 2
(Emphasis added.)
Estes v. Williams73 enjoined an American publisher's
use of the title "Chatterbox," under which an English
writer, James Johnston, had published juvenile books of
uniform appearance and wide circulation in England and
the United States. The court commented on the right of the
English publisher:
Johnston had the exclusive right to put his own work,
as his own, upon the markets of the world. No one else
had the right to represent that other work was his.
Not the right to prevent the copying of his, and putting
the work upon the markets, but the right to be free from
72 Id. at 731. See Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures, Corp., 186 F.2d 923
(9th Cir. 1951). This case held that representing a motion picture as a
"story only Mark Twain could tell," Mark Twain's favorite story, "and
Mark Twain's tale of a gamble in hearts" did not give rise to a cause of
action for unfair competition in favor of the executors of Samuel L. Clem-
ens because they did not have the right to the exclusive use of the name of
Mark Twain and because they had no rights in the story alleged to be in-
fringed upon, "The Jumping Frog of Calaveras County," which was in the
public domain.
73 21 Fed. 189 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1884).
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untrue representations that this other work was his when
put upon the markets. This gives him nothing but the
fair enjoyment of the just reputation of his own work,
which fully belongs to him. It deprives others of nothing
that belongs to them.7 4 (Emphasis added.)
The decisions in these cases were based upon the right
of the author not to have attributed to him works which
are not his. The word "unfair competition" is not referred
to. Nevertheless, in later cases, that concept is given as the
basis for the rulings. Typical is the following statement:
".. . Nor need we say that insofar as radio announcers
declare, directly or indirectly, that the broadcast of a
Whiteman record is the broadcast of a Whiteman per-
formance, that conduct is a tort which Whiteman could
enjoin. That would indeed be 'unfair competition.' "'
Other decisions have recognized the right of an author
to prohibit the exhibition of an elaboration of his work not
in keeping with the original story to which defendant had
obtained movie rights. 6 In Packard v. Fox Film Corp.7 7
a fiction writer had sold movie rights to a story entitled
"The Iron Rider." Subsequently, the motion picture com-
pany released a photoplay under the same name and
represented the author as the creator of the story presented
in themovie. In reality, the movie story had been written
by a third person and had not been taken from the
plaintiff's story. An action was sustained upon the ground
that the transfer of the right to use the title did not imply
the right to use it for a different story, and that such use
was a tort:
The law is well settled that the author of a literary
work possesses a property right therein, and that such
property right is subject to purchase and sale, the same
74 Id. at 190.
75 RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1940).
76 Curwood v. Affiliated Distributors, 283 Fed. 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1922);
Packard v. Fox Film Corp., 207 App. Div. 311, 202 N.Y.S. 164, (1st Dep't 1923).
77 Packard v. Fox Film Corp., supra note 76.
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as any other personal property. ... Whatever rights the
defendant acquired to use said story and in connection
therewith were limited by the terms of the contract, and
when defendant exceeded the rights thus acquired, and
used plaintiff's name in connection with an entirely
different story, defendant was appropriating something
which it had not purchased of the plaintiff.7s (Emphasis
added.)
In Drummond v. Altemus 9 a popular lecturer secured an
injunction against the publication of a book which, under
the guise of publishing a complete set of his "Lowell
lectures," gave merely a truncated form:
The complainant does not base his claim to relief upon
the statute, but upon his right, quite distinct from any
conferred by copyright, to protection against having any
literary matter published as his work which is not
actually his creation, and incidentally, to prevent fraud
upon purchasers. (Emphasis added.)
On the ground of unfair competition, the creator of the
"Mutt and Jeff" cartoon characters was granted injunctive
relief against the publication of cartoons of the same
characters drawn by others. According to the Court of
Appeals of New York: "
The controlling question in all cases where the equitable
power of the courts is invoked is whether the acts com-
plained of are fair or unfair. .. . The rules stated as to
competition in business apply to the publication of books
78 Id. at 165-67.
79 Drummond v. Altemus, 60 Fed. 338, 339 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1894).
80 Fisher v. Star Co., 231 N.Y. 414, 132 N.E. 133, 137 (1921). The seeming-
ly different conclusion reached in the case of the "Vargas" type girl draw-
ings, republished without credit to the author, in Vargas v. Esquire, 164 F.2d
522 (7th Cir. 1947), was arrived at, not so much on the rejection of the doc-
trine of unfair competition, as upon the fact that the artist had conveyed all
his rights to his drawings. The court felt that, in the circumstances,
there was no unfair competition by the defendant in the manner of their
use. This was also the basis for the ruling in Warner Bros. Pictures v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954), involving the
use of a character in "The Maltese Falcon," by its author, Dashiell Ham-
mett. The motion picture company which had produced the picture claimed
that use by another, even the author, of the character in a radio serial
constituted "unfair use and competition." But relief was denied. See Note,
The Protection of Literary Characters, 68 HAxv. L. REv. 349 (1954).
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under a particular name. Such a name is the subject of
property, and a colorable imitation of the name adopted
by one publisher, by another engaged in publishing
similar books by which the public may be easily misled
into supposing that it was the literary article they desired
to obtain, is an act of deception which injures the pub-
lisher who first adopted the name and which he may call
upon a court of equity to redress. (Emphasis added.)
Similarly, irrespective of copyright law, the courts have
offered protection to an author from appropriation of a
literary character which has become identified with the
person of the author. Where an actor has portrayed a
character in such a manner that the character has acquired
a personalized being identifiable with the creator of the
role, the courts also will extend relief. In such cases, the
injury results from a "counterfeiting" of the character or
role; the court will guard against deception as to the
creator of the character, labeling the appropriation unfair
competition."s
Thus, it is evident that in the realm of literary property,
the courts have sought to shield certain literary values by
a principle of guarding against deception, without regard
to the laws of copyright or the common law rights to
literary property. Deception exists when the work of an
author is (a) represented as that of another, (b) amplified
in a manner which is not consonant with the spirit of his
work, or (c) truncated so as to give an erroneous im-
pression of the whole. These, under another name, are an
83 Chaplain v. Amador, 93 Cal. App. 358, 269 Pac. 544, 546 (1928), in
which an actor was enjoined from imitating Charles Chaplain's pathetic
tramp. The unprivileged imitation of the character "Yukon Jake," made
popular by the author of a poem of that name, was prohibited in Paramore
v. Mack Sennett, 9 F.2d 66 (S.D. Cal. 1925), and the use of the name and
mannerism of "The Lone Ranger" was banned in Lone Ranger Inc. v. Cox,
124 F2d 650 (4th Cir. 1942), and in Jones v. Republic Productions, 112 F2d
672 (9th Cir. 1940). The courts also have found unfair competition in the
use of the word "Eerie" when attached to a series of "horror comic" books
entitled "Eerie Mysteries," in an action instituted by a publisher who had
the word as a title ("Eerie"), upon a showing that it was used on an imi-
tative cover on a series of similar books. Avon Publishing Co. v. Ziff-Davis
Publishing Co. 282 App. Div. 200, 122 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1st Dep't 1953).
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assertion of an author's right to the integrity of his work,
protecting him against its distortion-which, in the main,
is what the "moral right" of authors means. Therefore,
while our courts may hesitate to adopt formally the con-
cept of "moral right," in reality they have used "unfair
competition" to achieve many of the beneficial results of
the "moral right" doctrine.
Indeed, the spirit of the principle of author's "moral
right" may exist under other than unfair competition trap-
pings. For instance the highest Court of New York resorted
to the law of libel to compensate a plaintiff, a professional
lecturer and writer, for the opprobrium that followed upon
attribution to him of ideas in an article falsely published
by defendant over the plaintiff's name:
Suppose the defendant had published of the President
of the Governor of this state an article purporting to
have been written by him, in which his views therein
expressed were false and contrary to his avowed
principles theretofore made known to the public, and
further that it contained statements of fact regarding
public finances or prohibition or the tariff, which were
grossly inaccurate and absurd and ridiculous in the
eyes of those acquainted with governmental matters.
Would not such an article be libelous?8 2
82 Ben-Olie v. Press Pub. Co., 251 N.Y. 250, 167 N.E. 432, 434 (1929). We
have already given an instance in which protection against disparagement
of motion pictures was granted under the theory that the courts will pro-
tect property rights, intangible though they be, against wrongful invasion.
See note 67 supra.
Since this manuscript was prepared two decisions have been announced
which are pertinent to the discussion. In Ettore v. Philco Television Broad-
casting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d. Cir. 1956), the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit has sustained both under invasion of privacy and unfair
competition the right of a prize fighter to recover damages for telecasting
in Philadelphia and New York old moving pictures without his consent.
In the Southern District of New York, a decision was rendered which found
no unfair competition in the distribution of pirated phonograph records
despite the fact that the records carried the legend, "An A.F.N. Presenta-
tion," which would imply that they were original presentations rather than
records made from tape recordings, Miller v. Goody, 139 F. Supp. 176
(S.D.N.Y. 1956). This latter opinion would apply rigidly a rule that what
once is lost through publication should not be recaptured under unfair
competition. Cf. Looz, Inc. v. Ormont, 114 F. Supp. 211 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
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Fundamentally, the theory behind this pronouncement is
not far removed from the complete assertion of the right
of an author to the integrity of his work. The fact that
some courts have not always carried this reasoning to its
* logical conclusion merely shows that courts are human
and that specific pragmatic considerations, rather than
pure logic, may dictate a particular judgment. What is
important is that in the realm of literary property, the
courts have used the principles commonly associated with
"fair competition" and similar legal norms to achieve an
equitable result.
VII. SUMMARY
The law of unfair competition, since its promulgation by
judicial fiat in England and the United States, consistently
has been used by the courts to enforce a higher sense of
ethical dealing and responsibility than obtained at a par-
ticular time in the market place."
Even before the enactment of clause (b) of section 1338
of-title 28, U.S.C., the federal courts entertained claims
arising from unfair practices when they were related to
the determination of other federal rights. However, in
1948, in recodifying the Judicial Code, Congress re-
asserted the jurisdiction of the federal courts to hear unfair
competition claims ". . . when joined with a substantial
and related claim under the copyright, patent or trade-
mark laws.
The revisers of the code have stated specifically that
their object was to achieve in these three realms of federal
jurisprudence the equitable ideal of achieving greater
social peace by settling in a single suit as many contro-
versies as could arise from a particular situation:
83 See notes 36-41 supra.
84 62 STAT. 931 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (b) (1950).
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Subsection (b) is added and is intended to avoid
"piecemeal" litigation to enforce common-law and statu-
tory copyright, patent, and trade-mark rights by specific-
ally permitting such enforcement in a single civil action
in the district court. While this is the rule under Federal
decisions, this section would enact it as statutory
authority.8 5
The illustrations given in the preceding portions of this
study indicate that both before and after the enactment
of this subsection, in the field of copyright, patent, and
trade-mark law, the concept of unfair competition was used
as a means of rectifying wrongful action for which no
satisfactory remedies existed at law. The courts have pro-
tected, by the application of the ever-expanding principles
of this concept, rights which either did not exist under
the copyright, patent, or trade-mark law, or, which once
having existed, thereafter had expired. The courts adopted
the view that .equitable rights had come into being which
should be protected in order to prevent deception, whether
actual or probable.
As the depth of human deception cannot always be
plumbed, so the application of the concept varies from
time to time and even from case to case. The courts
constantly are finding that ".... there are many other ways
in which commercial unfairness may be committed." 6 In
the case from which this statement is taken, the right to
protect a rather weak symbol was sustained on the ground
of possible confusion both under the trade-mark and the
unfair competition law. In another recent case, from the
same circuit, unfair competition was found in infringement
of the word "Dutch" as applied to a type of paint."' One
is impressed from the opinion that the weakness of the
mark might have prevented full protection had the court
85 Reviser's note: U.S.C. at 4189 (1952).
86 Mershon Co. v. Pachmayr, 220 F.2d 879, 881 (9th Cir. 1955).
87 National Lead Co. v. Wolfe, 223 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1955). See Garner,
Narrow and Weak Trade-Marks, 22 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 40 (1953). For com-
ment on inconsistency of decisions, see note 52 supra.
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not been in a position to find likelihood of confusion. The
Lanham Trade-Mark Act makes confusing similarity an
element of both infringement and unfair competition in
federal trade-mark cases.' Both before and after the Lan-
ham Act protection has been afforded under the doctrine
of unfair competition, although the trade-mark itself was
invalid.,9 It also has been applied to rights which could not
be asserted under patent law. 0
The protection of "intellectual property" has not been
very extensive.9" However, the courts have protected the
right to the title of a work, its form, and created characters,
which might not have been possible under copyright law.'
The courts have hesitated to recognize the "moral
right" of authors to the integrity of their work and
against its distortion."3 The legislatures and courts in the
English-speaking world seem to have assumed that recog-
nition of the right stems only from contract. Chiefly for
this reason, the English Commission for the revision of
the copyright law reported in 1952 against the recognition
of this right. 4 A justifiable extension of the law of unfair.
competition, which, in many instances, has prevented
false represeitation or disparagement of a rival's property
or goods, could lead to the recognition of the right against
all literary distortion. 5
88 60 STAT. 437 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1952).
89 See note 42 supra, and cases cited in note 44 supra. See also Speed
Products Co. v. Tinnerman Products, 179 F2d 778 (2d Cir. 1949).
90 See cases cited in notes 46-49 supra.
9' See Birmingham, A Critical Analysis of the Infringement of Ideas,
5 CoPYRiT LAw Syzposmua 107 (1954); Nimmer, The Law of Ideas, 27 So.
CALn. L. REv. 119 (1954); Ninmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CoN-
TimPORARY PaoB. 203 (1954); Yankwich, Originality in the Law of Intellectu-
al Property, 11 F.R.D. 457 (1951).
92 See cases cited in notes 38-41, 80-81 supra.
93 See notes 61-62 supra.
94 Strauss, Le Droit Moral et la protection des droits personnels de
l'auteur in Le Droit D'auteur, 173-179, 185-188 (1955).
95 See 2 NnIs, UNFAIR CoBETn oN §§ 255-71, 271 (a) -281, at 884-938 (4th
ed. 1947). The following excerpts from two decisions many years apart indi-
cate the ease with which courts in particular cases can prevent injury to an-
Continued on page 468
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Another advantage of the application of the doctrine
of unfair competition is that the courts can avoid the rigid
and, at times, mandatory provisions as to damages in
patent,96 copyright,97 and trade-mark 8 infringement. In
unfair competition the remedy may be limited to injunc-
tion.99 Because it belongs to a court of chancery "to ex-
amine the conscience," equitable norms may be applied
effectively to a society which is in constant flux.
By using the concept of unfair practices, the courts have
not sought to evolve absolute formulas. Rather, they have
considered each case on its separate facts, and have
sought to apply to specific situations flexible principles of
equity aimed at fostering higher ethical business practices.
Such treatment is desirable, for in a growing and expand-
ing democratic order, changing trade conditions evolve
situations that cannot always be anticipated.
Therefore, attempts to formulate a unified theory may be
as difficult in this field as in the field of science. Indeed, in
science we deal with a physical universe which changes
slowly, if at all. In law, we deal with social relations which
other's reputation by enjoining misuse of his intellectual property while
asserting a contractually-derived doctrine close to a "moral right":
".... The implied assumption of the contract seems to us to be that
the play was to be produced only as a spoken drama, with respect
for the author's natural susceptibility concerning a strict adhesion
to the text." Manners v. Morosco, 252 U.S. 317, 326 (1920). (Emphasis
added.)
"It is patent that the characters of The Maltese Falcon could not
fairly be used in such a manner as to cause the Falcon to be ma-
terially lessened in its commercial worth by degrading or cheapen-
ing them so that the public would not be interested in their capers.
They could not be used in such a manner as to deceive the pub-
lic. . . ." Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
216 F.2d 945, 951 (9th Cir. 1954). (Emphasis added.)
96 66 STAT. 813, 35 U.S.C. §§ 284-89 (1952).
97 61 STAT. 661 (1947), 17 U.S.C. § 101 (b) (1952).
98 60 STAT. 437 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1952).
99 Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 130-31 (1947);
Straus v. Notaseme Hosiery Co., 240 U.S. 179, 181-83 (1916); Laskowitz v.
Marie Designer, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 541, 554-56 (S.D. Cal. 1954); RESTATE MENT,
TORTS § 744, comment b (1938). But see National Lead Co. v. Wolfe, 223 F.2d
195 (9th Cir. 1955).
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are constantly changing. As the aim of law is to satisfy the
continuing and expanding need for social control in a
complex society, all jural principles must have within them
possibilities of growth and development. So it is well that,
in applying the concept of unfair competition, the attitude
of the courts has been akin to that expressed by Mr. Justice
Story, when he stated that because the major clauses of
our Constitution are expressed in general terms, it is pos-
sible to adapt it to events ". . . which were locked up in
the inscrutable purposes of Providence."' o
American business life has in it a pervading, almost
feverish dynamism. This has enabled it to mold and adapt
itself to the changing demands of a consumer economy,
which expert merchandising and intensive and profession-
ally conducted advertising appeals have fed and, at times,
created. In the rivalry of modern business, the method of
approach is never the same. As it changes, so does the
pattern of deception which the concept of unfair com-
petition seeks to redress. It is inevitable, therefore, that the
judicial attitude should have been as inconstant as our
business ethos itself. For this reason, judges have not
always achieved consistency in the application of the
doctrine of unfair competition. Judges are human, and
ideal consistency is not always humanly attainable, nor
desirable. Years ago, Holmes wrote that: ".... the law is
always approaching, and never reaching, consistency.... It
will become entirely consistent only when it ceases to
grow." '  Applied in this spirit the concept of unfair
competition becomes a valued aid to equity, discouraging a
00 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 141, 156 (1816).
-01 HoLmms, THE Co ai oN LAw 36 (1881).
102 Judges who administer this and other equitable principles will, it is
hoped, at all times remember the admonition of Mr. Justice Cardozo:
"The judge is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant,
roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of good-
ness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He
is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated
Continued on page,470
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competitor's "free ride'""°s via unprivileged appropriation
of commercial values created by another, or, as Mr. Justice
Pitney put it, of "... the harvest of those who have
sown.,
104
Leon R. Yankwich*
Continued from page 469
benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition,
methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to
'the primordial necessity of order in the social life.' " CAiRozo, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICAL PROCESS 141 (1921).
103 See note, Unfair Competition, 46 HAiv. L. REv. 1171, 1173 (1933).
104 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239-40
(1918).
* Chief Judge, United States District Court, Southern District of
California.
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